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Abstract 
This paper examines case studies of purchaser-provider split in three public sector 
agencies in Queensland, Australia. The paper finds that these market arrangements 
coincided with organisational change within these agencies. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to establish a link between purchaser-provider split and the type of 
improvements that were achieved. Good management practices, improved 
communication techniques and the application of new technology were important 
instruments in achieving new efficiencies and improved client outcomes. The value of 
purchaser-provider split related mostly to its capacity to define outcomes, although 
developing these measures were also problematic with respect to transaction costs and 
their inability to measure qualitative outcomes. In addition, purchaser-provider split 
symbolised change within an organisation, and asserted a change in organisational 
culture. However, other tangible, operational benefits of purchaser-provider split are 
not obvious. 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, governments in most liberal democracies throughout the 
world have introduced public sector reforms that have been strongly influenced by the 
ideological propositions associated with public choice, agency theory and 
contestability. These approaches to public affairs have provided the intellectual 
foundations for purchaser-provider split that is a mechanism used for separating the 
formulation of policy from its delivery. 
 
Public choice assumes that government agencies are driven by self interest, and, 
therefore, “should not advise the government on policy directions and (emphasis 
added) implement agreed policy” (de Laine, 1997, p.5). Agency theory proposes that 
public administration can be constructed as contracts between groups whereby “the 
principal enters into a contract with ... the agent ... which agrees to undertake various 
functions ... in return for an agreed reward” (de Laine, 1997, p.5). Contestability 
assumes that public services are more efficient and effective where there is 
competition between public and private suppliers of services (OECD, 1995). 
Purchaser-provider split is the one arrangement that is consistent with these 
theoretical propositions. 
 
This paper examines the practical application of purchaser-provider split in three 
public sector ‘line agencies’ in Queensland, Australia. These case studies provide 
important insights into problems associated with attempts to separate policy from 
service delivery, and to define contractual obligations between purchasers and 
providers. These cases test the nature of the relationship that may evolve from 
purchaser-provider splits. 
 
The introduction of market reforms, and principal-agency agreements has been 
incremental rather than radical in Queensland. The slow progress of this process  
presents an  opportunity to assess the contribution of the purchaser-provider model in 
achieving improved outcomes. In other jurisdictions, the introduction of quasi-market 
arrangements has been dramatic. As a consequence, it has been difficult to isolate the 
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effect of specific management strategies from the outcomes associated with 
implementation of the new purchaser-provider structure.  
 
Here, it is proposed that the improved outcomes sometimes associated with purchaser-
provider split are over-estimated, and are able to be achieved within traditional public 
service structures. This paper concludes that purchaser-provider split can be a useful 
instrument of change management but there are also high transaction costs and 
barriers to intra-organisational communication associated with these types of 
arrangements.  The case studies examined in this paper suggest that improved 
outcomes are more likely to result from adopting creative management practices 
rather than the introduction of market or principal-agency arrangements. 
 
Purchaser-Provider Split 
Purchaser-provider split can be defined as an arrangement where “the purchaser is the 
agent who decides what will be produced, and ... the provider is the agent who 
delivers the agreed outputs or outcomes” (Department of Finance and Administration, 
1995, p. 9). In short, it is an arrangement whereby agents delivering a service are 
distanced from policy, and service delivery outcomes are defined and made 
transparent in contracts or service agreements. Defining outcomes and creating 
competition between service providers are central to the perceived benefits of this 
model of service delivery. The ability to clarify roles and responsibilities is believed 
to improve client responsiveness, to provide a clearer focus on individual 
responsibility, improve accountability and increase the capacity of managers to 
manage (Department of Finance and Administration, 1995). There are several 
common throughout the literature dealing with purchaser-provider split, although this 
literature is rarely in agreement over the consequences of purchaser-provider split. 
 
First, the capacity of purchaser-provider split to improve client focus is an important 
theme in the literature promoting purchaser-provider arrangements. For example, 
purchaser-provider arrangements have been proposed as a means of achieving greater 
community control over Aboriginal health care as community consumer organisations 
improve their capacity to define outcomes (Tsey and Scrimgeour, 1997). Similarly, it 
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has been argued that direct contracting of provider services “is intended to maximise 
consumer choice, access and satisfaction by putting consumers and providers at the 
centre of the purchasing process” (Burrows and Morovec, 1997, pp. 51-52).  
 
Indeed, it has been argued that purchaser-provider arrangements force managers to 
focus on “their core business, and on their clients, the Ministers” (Ball, 1993, p. 6). 
However, other studies have reported that purchaser-provider contracts create 
incentives for providers to misrepresent client characteristics (Forder, 1997). 
 
A second theme in the literature relates to the impact of purchaser-provider on power 
relationships. The theme of purchaser-provider split empowering clients is common in 
the literature (for example, Shepherd, Muijen, Hadley, and Goldman, 1996) as is the 
theme of increased autonomy for practitioners in determining the type of services 
delivered (Corney, 1996; Ham, 1994). Indeed, on study notes the limited influence of 
purchasers on delivery systems, in favour of the short term and organisational 
objectives pursued by providers (Rosen and Mays, 1998). Often these changes in 
power relationships are associated with reductions in staff morale and less attention 
being given to patients with severe disabilities (Shepherd et. al, 1996; Parryjones, 
Grant, Mcgrath, Caldock, Ramcharan and Robinson, 1998).  
  
More generally, the purchaser-provider relationship is sometimes associated with 
changes in notions of welfare and equity. The competitive emphasis of purchaser-
provider split may result in the disempowerment of those unable to assert their 
position in markets, or a retreat from the universality of welfare provision (Randall, 
1995). 
 
A third common theme is concerned with the impact of purchaser-provider split on 
organisational structures and coherence. Some have presented purchaser-provider 
reforms as a means of developing provider networks that are able to produce the same 
organisational advantages as integrated firms (Hurley, 1993). Others have argued that 
purchaser-provider delivery systems are more decentralised and pluralistic 
(Hokenstad and Johansson, 1996).  
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However, there is also some evidence that purchaser-provider splits become artificial 
as organisations are required to provide integrated systems of service delivery (Laing 
and Shiroyama, 1995). Others have argued that purchaser-provider split may result in 
organisations creating defences against client hostility and pseudo-transactions 
between practitioners and clients (Downe, Ernst and Smithers, 1996). 
 
Fourth, purchaser-provider split is usually considered to reduce the cost of providing 
services. For example, Gerdtham, Lonthgren, Tambour, and Rehnberg (1999) argued 
that the change from a budget-based allocation of resources to the type of output-
based allocation associated with purchaser-provider split would produce savings of 
almost 10%. However Laing and Shiroyama suggested that these cost savings were 
achieved through “increased outcome demands on provider units” (1995: 52). One 
study of social workers, community nurses and community psychiatric nurses 
concluded that the cost efficiencies of purchaser-provider split was also associated 
with increased workloads particularly administrative work, higher levels of job stress 
and reduced client contact (Parryjones et. al., 1998). Other literature notes that 
reductions in service delivery costs are likely to be diminished by the increased 
transaction costs associated with contractual arrangements (Ashton, 1998). 
 
A fifth area of dispute is the impact of purchaser-provider on competition. 
Competition is often understood to be an important factor in improving the 
responsiveness of services and focussing services more clearly on clients (for 
example, Lewis, Bernstock, Bovell and Wookey, 1996). Howver, the extent to which 
purchaser-provider split increases competition is disputed. For example, one study of 
market concentration in health care showed that purchaser-provider split had little 
impact on increasing market competition (Ashton and Press, 1997), while others have 
argued that competitive markets cannot exist in some areas of social services 
(Shackley and Healey, 1993). 
 
Others have argued that services such health care should be based on cooperation 
between delivery stakeholders rather than competition since competition can increase 
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the cost of providing services and requires extensive regulation (Coile, 1994). The 
need to move from competitive to cooperative models of service delivery is criticism 
of purchaser-provider split. Indeed, some authors have argued that as service delivery 
systems mature they evolve towards cooperative delivery in order to survive (for 
example, Bergman, 1998). 
 
This paper examines these perceived advantages and disadvantages of purchaser-
provider split in the context of an Australian state government which has introduced 
this mode of service delivery, incrementally. These studies focus on the extent to 
which purchaser-provider arrangements are instrumental in achieving enhanced 
outcomes, in comparison to other management strategies. The evidence of these cases 
is in agreement with Laing and Shiroyama’s finding that the distinctions between 
purchasers and providers are “essentially artificial and irrelevant” (Laing and 
Schiroyama, 1995, p.65) as organisations attempt to focus on clients. In these cases, 
improved outcomes have been achieved through the introduction of new technology 
or change management strategies rather than the implementation of a purchaser-
provider model. 
 
The Queensland Case Studies 
The context 
Queensland has been slower than other Australian and international jurisdictions to 
adopt new modes of service delivery, especially those modelled on contestability and 
competitive markets. The drivers of new contestable approaches to public sector 
management in other jurisdictions have been absent in Queensland. Probably the most 
compelling driver of these changes in other jurisdictions has been the need to reduce 
the cost of service delivery as a consequence of large budget deficits.  
 
The Queensland budgetary position has always been strong (Queensland Commission 
of Audit, 1996), and the need to reduce public expenditure has been less important 
than in other states. Second, the delivery of many public services in Queensland has 
been efficient in comparison to other jurisdictions (Queensland Commission of Audit, 
1996; Ryan, 1993). Finally, the employment impact of new modes of public sector 
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management has been a consistent political concern of Queensland governments 
needing to win the support of a highly regionalised electorate (for example, see Office 
of the Public Service, 1997). Rationalisation of government services has particularly 
adverse economic and social impacts on politically sensitive regional centres. 
 
The Queensland Commission of Audit (1996) was established by, and reported to, the 
deposed conservative Borbidge government (1996-1998). This Commission provided 
a significant contribution to promoting new modes of public sector management based 
on creating markets and competition. Previous government policy has tended to focus 
on corporatisation (Queensland Treasury, 1992) and commercialisation (Queensland 
Treasury, 1994) rather than privatisation or contracting. The Queensland Commission 
of Audit (1996) provided a starting point for introducing a clearer public focus on 
contestability and competition. Although this Commission made recommendations 
favouring the implementation of new contestable modes of service delivery, there is a 
lack of clarity concerning a ‘whole of government’ approach to these new approaches 
to public sector management. 
 
The Queensland Commission of Audit recommended moving Queensland public 
administration towards a purchaser-provider split, and ‘the constant stimulus of 
competition’ (Queensland Commission of Audit, 1996). This model appeared to be 
supported in other Borbidge government documents such as the State Strategic Plan 
(Queensland Government, 1997a) and Managing for Outcomes (Queensland 
Treasury, 1997a). For example, the “State Strategic Plan” indicated that an efficient 
and effective public service would be achieved through:  
 
 - a stronger focus on contestability and competition to determine the best 
 means of delivery; 
 - separating the roles of purchaser and provider in Government service 
 delivery where appropriate, to achieve best value service delivery to 
 Queenslanders (Queensland Government, 1997a, p. 29). 
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Thus, public administration in Queensland was slowly moving towards the 
implementation of purchaser-provider split arrangements in the mid 1990s. However, 
implementation of these public sector management practices were tempered by a 
strong financial situation, and a rural-based, conservative government which required 
the support of an independent member of parliament to form a government.  
 
Methodology 
The case studies presented in this paper centre on purchaser-provider split 
arrangements implemented within three agencies in the Queensland public service. 
These agencies are Queensland Legal Aid within the Department of Justice, a regional 
health service within Queensland Health, and Call Centres within Queensland 
Transport. The empirical basis for these case studies was 45 interviews (see list of 
interviewees at the end of this paper) with public service managers and other 
stakeholders such as community representatives and implementing agents, in 
conjunction with both public and confidential documentation published by agencies. 
Agencies co-operated with this research on the basis that interviewees and 
confidential documentation would not be cited directly. 
 
 
Legal Aid 
Legal Aid Queensland (LAQ) is a statutory authority established under the Legal Aid 
Queensland Act, 1997. Its primary function is to provide access to justice for all 
Queensland citizens regardless of their socio-economic position (Legal Aid 
Queensland, 1998). The introduction of purchaser-provider arrangements within 
Legal Aid were linked closely to changes in funding arrangements within the 
organisation.  
 
Until June, 1997 the Federal and State government provided base funding under the 
Commonwealth-State financial agreement, with supplementary funding being 
provided for specific activities such Women’s Legal Aid, Child Support and the 
Community Legal Centre Program. In 1997/98, funding arrangements for legal aid 
were altered, and LAQ was established to provide legal services for Federal legal 
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issues, on an agency basis. Federal government funding to legal aid was $18 million 
in 1997/98 which was $2 million less than the previous year (Legal Aid Commission 
of Queensland, 1997).  
 
As a consequence of cuts in funding, significant external pressure was placed on LAQ 
to adopt a purchaser-provider split. This model was particularly favoured by 
Queensland Treasury which had adopted the view that this type of corporate structure 
would clarify roles and achieve new efficiencies in service delivery (Queensland 
Treasury, 1997a; Queensland Treasury, 1997b). The rationale was that LAQ could 
address funding pressures by achieving more with less, and improve the quality of 
their service (Legal Aid Queensland, 1997). 
 
A new purchaser-provider corporate structure was introduced on 30 June, 1998. The 
purchasing role was performed by the Purchasing Group which was responsible for 
grants of legal aid to the Legal Practice division of LAQ, private providers and 
Community Legal Centres. The service provider role within LAQ was performed by 
the Legal Practice division of LAQ. The Legal Practice division of LAQ was not 
expected to compete with private practitioners although senior management indicated 
that the Legal Practice division was able to compete with the private sector in terms of 
cost. 
 
In addition to these structural changes, LAQ introduced several customer focused 
initiatives to improve access to legal aid services. Some of these changes were also 
introduced in order to address the need for more efficient use of resources as a 
consequence of funding cuts. These service delivery initiates are summarised in Table 
1.  
 
Outcomes 
Surveys conducted by LAQ to measure client satisfaction show a high level of 
satisfaction with legal services. In 1997, of 1083 respondents to a legal aid survey 
(response rate 68%), 81% of clients rated services as ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’ (Legal 
Aid Commission of Queensland, 1997). Thus, there is a high level of client 
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satisfaction with legal aid services. New initiatives summarised in Table 1 have the 
potential to enhance services further. 
 
Table 1 Improved Service Delivery Initiatives. 
 
 
NATURE OF INITIATIVE OBJECTIVES 
 
PC VIDEO LINKS 
Prison service 
commenced 
September 1997. 
Wider services under 
trial. 
A PC Video advice link was 
established between Brisbane 
Legal Aid Prison Service and 
Woodford Prison. It is 
expected that similar links can 
be established for remote 
communities. 
• Improve access to 
legal advice for 
remote communities 
• Reduce travel to 
remote communities 
to provide in-person 
advice 
INFORMATION 
KIOSKS 
Commenced May 
1997. 
Based on touch-screen 
computer technology which 
enables clients to access 
information on legal topics. 
The service also provides 
instructions and forms for 
Small Claims and Small Debts 
courts and Dissolution of 
Marriage proceedings. 
• Reduce the need for 
case work by 
improving access to 
legal information 
• Improve accuracy of 
advice 
• Enhance customer 
satisfaction 
CALL CENTRE 
Commenced October 
1997 
Call Centre operators answer 
client questions from a 
computer database with 
information on over 1500 legal 
topics. 
• Improve access to 
legal services  
• Reduce response 
times for client 
inquiries 
• Improve accuracy 
and consistency of 
information 
CONFERENCING 
Ongoing, receiving 
greater emphasis. 
Program involves mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration. 
Conferences mostly relate to 
Family Law matters. Greater 
emphasis is being placed on the 
resolution of disputes through 
conferencing. 
• Reduce costs 
associated with court 
proceedings 
• Less adversarial 
dispute resolution 
ELECTRONIC  
LODGEMENT OF 
APPLICATIONS FOR 
AID 
Under trial. 
Select private legal providers 
are now able to lodge 
applications for legal aid 
electronically. 
• Reduce admin costs 
• Speed up process for 
grants of aid 
• Improve satisfaction 
of private legal aid 
suppliers 
Sources: Interviews with Senior Management of Legal Aid Queensland and Legal 
Aid Commission of Queensland, 1997. 
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However, the implementation of purchaser-provider arrangements and the growing 
funding pressures have the potential to negatively impact on the quality of service 
delivery and ultimately, client satisfaction. Efficiency and cost considerations are 
becoming so important that, on occasions, staff are spending less time with clients 
than was previously the case. 
 
Private legal providers expressed less satisfaction with LAQ services than recipients 
of legal aid. Only 59% of  private practitioners surveyed rated LAQ services to 
support private service providers as ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’. At briefing sessions to 
inform practitioners of legal aid policy, concerns were raised regarding the level of 
fees for private services and the level of government funding for legal aid (Legal Aid 
Commission of Queensland, 1997). The introduction of electronic lodgement of 
applications for legal aid has the potential to improve the relationship between LAQ 
and private suppliers because it reduces the administrative costs and inefficiencies 
associated with applications for legal aid. 
 
Senior Management indicated that Community Legal Centres had significant concerns 
regarding the introduction of purchaser-provider arrangements at LAQ. In particular, 
there was a concern that service agreements might restrict the nature of legal services 
which could be provided by Community Legal Centres, undermining their role in the 
provision of social justice to disadvantaged and low income groups. Community 
Legal Centres were also concerned that their law reform activities, which were often 
of a politically controversial nature, would no longer be funded because service 
agreements specified the nature of services to be provided in return for funding.  
 
The effect of the introduction of purchaser-provider arrangements on the efficiency of 
LAQ is not clear. While it appears that there has been the capacity to make 
improvements on administrative costs associated with service delivery, these issues 
have been addressed through technological initiatives rather than any inherent benefits 
derived from purchaser-provider arrangements.   
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In the case of LAQ, purchaser-provider split appears mostly irrelevant to efficiency 
gains achieved within the organisation. Improvements in service delivery were mostly 
achieved through the introduction of new technology rather than the implementation 
of the purchaser-provider split restructure. Indeed, staff indicated that purchaser-
provider split had the potential to reduce the quality of service as the focus of 
attention moved from social justice to unit cost. Community Legal Centres were 
particularly concerned at these new funding arrangements as they focus on units of 
service to the exclusion of advocacy activities such as law reform. 
 
A District Health Service within Queensland Health 
The purchaser-provider structure in Queensland Health emerged from the process of 
restructuring in 1996 when Regional Health Authorities and Regional Offices were 
disbanded and Central Office was restructured into a smaller corporate office. The 
purchaser-provider structure consists of two divisions: Health Services Division 
(provider); and Planning and Systems Division (owner/funder/purchaser). The Health 
Services Division consists of 39 District Health Services, three District Co-ordination 
units, Public Health Services and Pathology and Scientific Services. The Planning and 
System Division consists of six branches, including Health Systems Strategy Branch 
and Performance Management Branch.  
 
Service agreements have been introduced between Performance Management Branch 
(purchaser) and District Health Services, non-government organisations (NGOs) and 
the private sector (providers). The main objective of service agreements has been to 
“more adequately link expenditure to program commitments, and lead to 
improvements in Queensland Health’s operational effectiveness and efficiency” 
(Queensland Health, 1997a, p. 5). The service agreements outline the funding 
provided as well as the hospital, community and public health services for which a 
provider will be responsible in return for funding (Queensland Health, 1997b). This 
process includes an emphasis on accountability and budget integrity, and involves 
devolution of responsibility to the level of the organisation at which expenditure 
occurs. The objectives of enhanced transparency and accountability have been 
paramount in the process of structural change in Queensland Health.  
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Improved information systems accompanied the introduction of purchaser-provider 
arrangements and service agreements in Queensland Health, particularly in relation to 
hospitals. These systems improved transparency with respect to the funding and 
quality of service delivery. The view amongst Senior Management was that the most 
significant changes in Queensland Health have occurred in relation to surgery. 
 
The reforms in surgery are linked to the goal of reducing the waiting times for elective 
procedures by increasing the throughput of patients within the hospital system 
(Queensland Health, 1997c). The objective of ‘Surgery on Time’ was launched by 
Queensland Health on 1 July 1996. This program was supported by increased funding 
for elective surgery, however, it was based on the principle that waiting times should 
be reduced by increasing throughput. Waiting times for elective surgery in 
Queensland were benchmarked against national standards (Queenalnd Health, 1997c). 
This program focused on Category 1 patients (defined as those whose condition ‘has 
the potential to deteriorate quickly to an emergency level’) and Category 2 patients 
(defined as those whose condition ‘caused some pain, dysfunction or disability but not 
likely to deteriorate quickly’) (Minister for Health, 1997). Funding was linked to 
targets so that funding was potentially reduced if hospitals did not keep the number of 
Category 1 patients waiting for treatment longer than 30 days below the target of 5 
percent. Funding for Category 2 patients was also dependent on hospitals meeting 
waiting time targets (Queensland Health, 1997d). 
 
The major focus of the ‘Surgery on Time’ program in 1996/1997 was the urgent 
Category One patients whose waiting time beyond clinically appropriate times was 
reduced from 49 percent to 3.6 percent by 1 May 1997 (Minister for Health, 1997; 
Queensland Health, 1997b). The number of Category 2 patients waiting beyond the 
clinically appropriate time of 90 days was reduced to 44.3% by 1 May 1997 (Minister 
for Health, 1997).  Significant progress has been made in this area, especially in 
relation to Category 1 patients although there remains significant room for progress in 
relation to Category 2 and Category 3 patients. Some within the organisation 
expressed the view that improved outcomes were achieved because clear targets had 
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been set and funding was linked to performance in relation to those targets. Increased 
throughput occurred in part because of the increase in the number of day only 
admissions and reductions in the average length of stay per admission (Queensland 
Health, 1997b). 
 
The ‘Surgery on Time’ project has been successful in reducing waiting times for 
elective surgery but one of the consequences is that some of the burden for health care 
has shifted from hospital services to community health services, whether provided by 
Queensland Health or by NGOs. As a result of increased hospital throughput there has 
been a need for increased delivery of services outside the hospital environment. The 
general perception amongst Senior Management was that the approach taken by 
Queensland Health through the ‘Surgery on Time’ Project can be applied to 
community health services. The ‘Surgery on Time’ project developed performance 
measures and linked funding provided by the purchaser to outcomes achieved by the 
supplier. 
 
Some interviewees expressed the view that the pressure to get patients out of hospital 
into the community is taking place in part because community health services, in 
particular NGO community health services, are delivered at a much cheaper cost than 
hospital services. As a consequence, the push to increase throughput in hospitals in 
order to move patients out into the community sooner is seen as a means of  reducing 
the overall cost of health service delivery.  
 
However, Senior Management expressed the view that it is more beneficial for 
patients to spend less time in hospitals, for example, because of the risk of  hospital 
acquired infection. They also indicated that there has been a lack of clarity concerning 
the cost of different community health services, whether provided by Queensland 
Health or by NGOs.  
 
The services provided by community health services are heterogeneous and are 
difficult to define and measure. It has been difficult to define targets in relation to 
community based health services and to benchmark outcomes. Indeed, attempts to 
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link funding to outcomes in the current environment have the potential to result in 
under-funding of community based health services. Representatives of NGOs 
expressed concern that new funding arrangements will constrain advocacy, research, 
health education and health promotion activities. Purchaser-provider arrangements 
provides  a greater opportunity for the purchaser to selectively fund components of the 
range of services provided by providers. 
 
In the case of Queensland Health, purchaser-provider arrangements appear to have 
resulted in improvements in transparency and a decrease in the waiting time 
associated with surgery. The main concern has been the capacity of the model to 
move responsibility for health care from public hospitals to community health 
services. Here, NGOs are concerned that purchaser-provider arrangements are moving 
their activities away from achieving broader social objectives towards the provision of 
low cost health care, compensating for deficiencies in the hospital system. 
 
Furthermore, health professionals consistently indicated their opposition to these 
funding arrangements, on the grounds that cost pressures were taking precedence over 
high quality services. Most health care professionals suggested that good public health 
care depended on the subordination of funding considerations to broader social 
considerations. Clinicians insisted that funding models do not influence their 
behaviour, and should never be allowed to do so. Indeed, doctors and nurses appeared 
to have little knowledge of new purchaser-provider funding arrangements. 
Accordingly, the model appeared to have little impact on their work practices. 
 
Queensland Transport Call Centres 
In the 1996/97 financial year, Queensland Transport performed 450,000 vehicle 
inspections and 80,000 driving tests. In the same period, more than 4.9 million 
transactions and over 1.5 million inquiries were handled by Queensland Transport 
staff. Together these services accounted for departmental revenues of $563 million in 
vehicle registration fees, $26 million in drivers’ licences and $29 million in traffic 
infringement fines (Queensland Transport, 1997). The Department’s client service 
delivery network is maintained through a series of service delivery options which 
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includes Call Centres which provide a ‘one-stop’ telephone service,  an automated 
telephone voice response service, a phone-pay facility known as BPAY and customer 
service centres.  
 
This case study focuses on the operation of Call Centres which utilise ‘superhighway’, 
information technology as a means of providing cost efficient and flexible services. A 
purchaser-provider split arrangement was introduced with respect to Call Centres in 
1998. The purchaser and owner is the Land Transport and Safety division with 
Queensland Transport, and the providers are  Call Centres. 
 
Call Centres are highly cost efficient enterprises which have the added advantage of 
increasing revenue to government. Greater monitoring capabilities of licensing and 
vehicle registration allows efficiencies in license renewal reminders, fine payment 
recovery, stolen vehicle checks and better co-ordination of the programs. Call Centres 
enable not only inbound customer inquiries and transactions to be undertaken, but 
outbound campaigns to be conducted as well. Simple tasks such as checking current 
addresses through to enabling linkages for co-ordinated fine payment systems 
establish an efficient dual role for Call Centres and constitute a high level of Call 
Centre service. A survey of  Queensland Transport clients indicated that 76% of their 
clients considered their service to be excellent, very good or good (BCMQT Team, 
1997). 
 
Thus, it reasonable to assume that Call Centres have been successful in achieving 
improved outcomes such as greater efficiency and a clear client focus but it is not 
clear that purchaser-provider arrangements have contributed to these gains. Indeed, 
this case highlights the inability of purchaser-provider arrangements to deal with the 
political issues associated with the delivery of public services. In this case, these 
political issues have limited the capacity of Queensland Transport to fully implement 
purchaser-provider arrangements. 
 
For example, there is a tension within the Department between senior managers 
wanting to move the agency towards the creation of public sector markets, and 
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managers who prefer traditional models of public administration. The different 
approaches to public sector management appear to have some historical grounding in 
the 1989 merger of several different agencies, some of which favoured 
commercialisation and others which were opposed to the concept. 
 
Government has also been reluctant to allow agencies to move towards open market 
mechanisms such as competition between suppliers. The ‘whole-of-government’ 
advice on ‘best-in-class’ Call Centres proposes “outsourcing of only specific and 
after-hours or overflow traffic” (Enhance Management, 1998, p. 8). Government has 
considered Call Centres to be an instrument of regional development and employment 
(Enhanced Management, 1998), and regions have been particularly sensitive to 
private competition for the delivery of these services. Furthermore, Call Centres were 
part of a broader ‘whole of government’ information technology strategy (Queensland 
Government, 1997b), and purchaser-provider arrangements have the potential to 
diminish political flexibility with respect to service delivery. The implementation of 
purchaser-provider split was a minimalist position which was a compromise between 
market approaches to public management and traditional notions of public 
administration.  
 
Another issue emerging from this case study relates to the extent to which purchaser-
provider splits can achieve distinctive roles. Call Centres have been considered an 
important component of building telecommunications and information technology 
infrastructure in Queensland (Queensland Government, 1997b). However, there 
appears to be important issues concerning the standard of equipment used by Call 
Centres. These issues have some linkage to the management of the purchaser-provider 
split. 
 
In this case, the purchaser regulates the provider. The purchaser, Land Transport and 
Safety also owns some of the equipment used by the supplier Call Centres. Some 
interviewees noted that the equipment being used by Call Centres is sub-standard but 
it is not clear whether it is the responsibility of the purchaser or provider to upgrade 
this equipment. The poor standard of the equipment appears to be a factor limiting the 
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capacity of Call Centres to enhance industry capacity. Purchaser-provider 
arrangements have confused responsibilities with respect to upgrading the technology. 
 
The purchaser-provider split appears to exhibit a degree of symbolism rather than 
achieving tangible benefits, with respect to Call Centres. There remains complex 
linkages between the purchaser and provider with respect to roles and responsibilities. 
The purchaser has regulatory responsibilities over the provider. The purchaser owns 
equipment used by the provider, and the purchaser is required to buy services from 
one provider. This case suggests that a clear purchaser-provider split is very difficult 
to achieve in a complex service delivery environment, especially in circumstances 
where service delivery has important significance with respect to achieving broader 
‘whole of government’ and political objectives. 
 
In this case, purchaser-provider split does not appear to be an important factor in 
achieving improved client focus and greater efficiencies. Utilising advanced 
information technology has been instrumental in achieving these outcomes. In some 
ways, the purchaser-provider split has confused responsibilities or been ignored as 
governments are required to redefine the role of Call Centres to accommodate broader 
regional development, or technology infrastructure objectives.  
 
Conclusions 
The changes examined in this paper resulted in improved information systems, clarity 
in terms of the nature of services provided by the organisation and clarity of funding 
arrangements. However, these changes were not clearly linked to the purchaser-
provider model.  That is, changes could have been achieved within the traditional 
model of public sector management.  These changes could have been achieved 
through good management practices which established communication channels and 
response processes both within the organisation and between the organisation, and the 
community and clients.  This alternative approach would not compromise the social 
objectives of the organisation and therefore would not produce the disruption and 
conflict associated with the introduction of quasi-market arrangements such as 
purchaser-provider split.   
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These case studies were examined to determine whether adopting a purchaser-
provider split enhanced organisational arrangements to formulate policy and deliver 
services.  While the case studies indicates that aspects of service delivery were 
improved, it is not clear that purchaser-provider split was responsible for achieving 
these gains.  The Department of Finance and Administration (Department of Finance 
and Administration, 1995) expected benefits of greater client service, achieving a 
focus on individual responsibility and improved accountability, and management to 
flow from splitting purchaser and provider roles. For example, better client 
responsiveness was achieved in Queensland Transport Call Centres, although further 
improvement were constrained precisely by the purchaser-provider arrangements. The 
purchaser owned the outdated equipment utilised by the provider, Call Centres. 
 
Rather than providing a clearer focus on the responsibility of individuals, 
relationships between purchasers and providers often become confused, especially 
when the purchaser also carried out a regulatory function.  In this way, the purchaser 
was involved in setting the rules for agency activities including regulating the 
behaviour of providers. Far from removing ‘self interest’ from public sector activity 
as a consequence of purchaser-provider split, the regulator/purchaser could protect its’ 
own sphere of interest, while pressuring the provider to conform to unrealistic 
performance standards. 
 
Relationships in agencies were constrained from focusing on social objectives and the 
long term by the output focus of the purchaser-provider split. LAQ suffered as a result 
of a tighter budgetary regime. The splitting of purchaser-provider exposed legal aid 
programs to competition from ‘cut rate’ private providers who could only provide 
minimum service for the price. 
 
As instrument of improving accountability and performance, implementation of 
purchaser-provider split in the Department of Health resulted in reduced waiting times 
for surgery. However, efficiencies were gained by freeing up bed days with higher 
throughput of patients. The real costs of health care were obscured by moving some of 
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the costs of patient care following surgery from hospitals to the non-government 
sector. Efficiencies in surgery cannot be gained by introducing mechanisms for 
competition as doctors hold a monopoly in providing these specialist medical 
services. 
 
Service agreements, while providing clear roles for the parties to these agreements, 
were not able to capture the range of activities undertaken by service providers. 
Community Legal Centres were concerned that the advocacy work in relation to law 
reform could not be funded because of the contractual rigidities of service agreements. 
Agreements which rely on improvements in response times for Call Centres are 
problematic when operators are locked into utilising outdated equipment. 
 
It is difficult to identify specific benefits of purchaser-provider arrangements with 
respect to these case studies. Legal Aid and Call Centres have been able to achieve 
improved delivery systems mostly as a consequence of new technology rather than 
from any clarification of the roles of purchasing and providing. Indeed, in the case of 
Call Centres there appeared to be strong organisational imperatives which prevented 
these roles being separated. In particular, Call Centres were part of broader political 
agenda requiring the type of flexibility and responsiveness not usually associated with 
the contractual obligations that form part of distinct purchaser-provider roles. 
 
In the case of Legal Aid and Health, providers were most concerned at the 
implications of these funding arrangements for broader social justice objectives. 
Indeed, these studies imply that there is a fundamental problem with attempting to 
isolate components of service delivery systems. It is very difficult to isolate social 
justice from the delivery of publicly funded health and legal services. Indeed, recent 
policy analysis literature suggests that policy implementation requires integrated 
delivery systems which encourage co-operation and collaboration between 
implementation stakeholders (Ryan, 1996). 
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